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ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND P~uc POLICY. By Neal K. Komesar. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press. 1994. Pp. xi, 287. $ 34.95.
IMPERFECT

According to a standard history of American legal thought, in
the 1930s and 40s a generation of thinkers broke down the reigning
analytical structure of the law - legal formalism - that conceived
of law as a science that decided cases by deducing conclusions from
authoritative premises.1 The legal process school emerged as formalism's chief contender and soon took its place as the dominant
school of legal thought. The advocates of this new thinking rallied
around a few central ideas, including law as social policy, and the
importance of institutional competence. As two commentators recently noted,2 the school produced legal classics, such as Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 3 Lon Fuller's
"Forms and Limits of Adjudication,"4 and, most importantly, Hart
and Sacks's unfinished and long-unpublished teaching materials entitled The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law. 5 In the 1960s and 70s, however, social divisions such
as the civil rights and women's movements and sudden economic
insecurity undermined this legal consensus, and "the socio-political
conditions for the legal process synthesis ended."6
1. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960, at 109212 (1992); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADmoN 154-77 (1988). Professor Arthur A. Leff has provided an "intellectual parod[y]" of this history:
Once upon a time there was Fonnalism. The law itself was a deductive 'system, with
unquestionable premises leading to ineluctable conclusions .... The job of legal commentators ..• was to find the consistent thread in the inconsistent statements of others
and pull it all together along the seam of what was implicit in "the logic of the system."
Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451, 453 (1974). Joseph Beale summed up the fonnalist approach in stating that "law
.•. is not a mere collection of arbitrary rules, but a body of scientific principles [that] in great
part •.. consists in a homogeneous, scientific and all-embracing body of principle." JOSEPH
BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 24-25 (1935), quoted in Leff, supra, at 459.
2. William Eskridge & Philip Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARv. L.
REv. 2031, 2048-49 (1994).
3. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953).
4. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978)
(revision of the draft originally prepared in 1956-57).
5. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (tent. ed. 1958). The legal process school takes its name from Hart and Sacks's work.
6. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 2051 ("In the •.. 1970s, the halls of Harvard Law
School during Sacks's tenure as dean echoed with faculty announcements that 'legal process
is dead."').

1559

1560

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1559

Legal process is back. Last year, in "one of the most unusual
decisions in the history of legal publishing,"7 Foundation Press published the 1958 "tentative edition" of Hart and Sacks's canonical
work.8 In an article discussing its publication after a thirty-five year
delay, the new editors of The Legal Process, Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, argue that "the legal process philosophy
is, in some respects, even more productive today than it was in the
1950s.... [N]ew positive theories of political institutions ... suggest
more sophisticated ways of thinking about the different competencies of institutions and about the dynamics of their relationships in other words, a more sophisticated Hart-and-Sacks analysis ... ."9
The editors observe that former students of the legal process
school, such as Justice Stephen Breyer and Judge Richard Posner,
have applied their learning to new legal issues in administrative law,
constitutional law, and statutory interpretation.10 Moreover, a new
generation of legal-process theorists - including Judge Guido Calabresi, and Eskridge and Frickey themselves - have been inspired
to revive the study of statutory interpretation.11 Eskridge and
Frickey end their article with a challenge:
If institutions are central to law's unfolding, is it not our responsibility
to develop theories of comparative institutional legitimacy and efficacy? Hart and Sacks posed good questions. Their would-be heirs in
the 1990s face the challenge of answering those questions as well as
the new ones posed by the critics of the legal process.12

Professor Neal K. Komesar13 has taken up the challenge. His
book, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy, offers an elegant and encyclopedic argument for the necessity of comparing institutions when making law
and public policy.14 He drills home his message with messianic zeal:
any decision about law or public policy depends not only on a set of
values or goals that we want to achieve, but also on an evaluation as
7. Id. at 2031.
8. HART & ALBERT, supra note 5.
9. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 2053.
10. Id. at 2052 (citing, among others, STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
346-68 (1982); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93
(1985)).
11. Id. (citing, among others, GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR TIIE AGE OF
STATUTES 87-90 (1982); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 11
CAL. L. REv. 919, 919-20 (1989) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1988))).
12. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 2, at 2055.
13. James E. and Ruth B. Doyle-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
14. Komesar briefly discusses The Legal Process as one of "three major works on institutional choice •.. requir[ing] comparison to my approach." P. 11. He distinguishes Hart and
Sacks's work as "significantly different from mine. [1bey] presented a largely idealized image of institutions.••. [T]heir conception of institutional behavior assumes away most of the
difficulty and richness of institutional choice." P. 12.
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to which institution - the market, the courts, or the political system - can best achieve such values or goals. To this end,
Komesar's book presents and applies a theory of how to compare
institutions.
The breadth of Komesar's project is striking. In making his argument and presenting his theory, he reprimands countless prominent legal thinkers for their failure to compare institutions. The list
of Komesar's targets reads like a "Who's Who" of constitutional
and law and economics scholarship. His book finds failures of institutional analysis in John Rawls's Theory of Justice,1s Richard Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 16 John Hart Ely's Democracy and
Distrust, 11 Richard Epstein's Takings, 18 Cass Sunstein's analysis of
constitutional protection against rent seeking,19 and Bruce Ackerman's criticism2 o of the famous Carolene Products footnote four. 21
He also takes minor jabs at Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed's analysis of the choice between property and liability rules,22
Calabresi's A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, 23 and Laurence
Tribe's antiprocess view of constitutional law.24 On the law and economics front, Komesar criticizes Patricia Danzon's proposed
schedule of pain-and-suffering damages in tort,25 Alan Schwartz's
recommendation for administrative fines in place of reduced damages to obtain accident deterrence,26 and W. Kip Viscusi's preference for administrative over tort regulation of product design
defects.27 Moreover, Komesar indicts whole schools of thought originalist (pp. 262-65) and fyndamental-rights approaches (pp.
\

15. Pp. 34-44 {discussing JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY oF JurnCE (1971)). '
16. Pp. 17-22, 157-61 {discussing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw {4th
ed. 1992)).
17. Pp. 198-215 {discussing JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST {1980)).
18. Pp. 235-44 (discussing RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS {1985)).
19. Pp. 217-21 {discussing Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29 {1985)).
20. Pp. 221-30 {discussing Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 989 HARv. L.
REv. 713 (1985)).
21. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
22. P. 22 n.17 (discussing Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1098 {1972)).
23. P. 137 n.13 (discussing Gumo CALABRESI, A CoMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)).
24. P. 215 & n.37 (discussing Laurence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980)).
25. Pp. 179-80 (discussing Patricia Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in
Private Markets, 13 J. LEGAL Sruo. 517 {1984)).
26. Pp. 180-81 {discussing Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A
Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 371-84 (1988)).
27. P. 180 n.49 {discussing W. Kn> VIscus1, REFORMING PRooucrs LIABILITY 128
(1991)).
.

1562

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 93:1559

256-61) to constitutional judicial review and interest-group political
theory (pp. 216-21) - as wrongheaded or incomplete.
What is all the fuss about? According to Komesar, these thinkers have fundamentally missed the boat by failing to analyze the
institutions that make and apply law.28 First, the worst sinners simply ignore the all-important question of "Who Decides?" The big
target in this group is Rawls. According to Komesar, Rawls's Theory of Justicew merely articulates and ranks principles of liberty and
equality, and '~focuses virtually no attention on real world institutions and institutional choice" (p. 37). Komesar argues that such an
"etherial and arid" worldview (p. 39) proves useless for lawmaking
because justice requires not only the ordering of values, but also
"the presence of institutions capable of translating high-sounding
principles into substance" (p. 41). When a theory like Rawls's contains "such loosely defined elements and complicated standards ...
the character of the institutions that will define and apply these
goals becomes an essential - perhaps the essential - component
in the realization of the just society.''30
Second, Komesar assails well-known legal scholars as suffering
from the defect he calls "single institutionalism" (p. 6). According
to Komesar, these scholars rightly evaluate the competence of a
particular institution like the market, the courts, or the political system, but they myopically ignore the alternatives. For example,
Komesar argues that Richard Posner's analysis of the common law,
with its exclusive focus on how well markets work, is "single institutional" rather than "comparative institutional" (p. 20). He points
out that Posner's choice between markets, via a property rule, and
courts, via a liability rule, as the institution that can most efficiently
resolve the problem of local pollution turns solely on the market's
varying ability to accommodate transactions (pp. 20-22). For Pos28. Regarding constitutional judicial review, Komesar goes so far as to say that "scholars
and judges must accept the difficult task of.institutional choice •..• Any analysis that does
not centrally focus on this task is largely useless." P. 270.
29. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
30. P. 42. Komesar writes further that "UJust societies are based not on the announcement of broad principles but on the design of real world institutional decision-making
processes and the designation of which process will decide which issues." Pp. 48-49. To
illustrate this flaw in Rawls's theory, Komesar attempts to apply Rawls's principle of ordered
liberty to the real-world dilemma presented by the Pentagon Papers case. Pp. 42-49 (discussing New York Tunes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). In this case, the federal
government brought an action to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from
publishing a top-secret Defense Department study of the Vietnam War, claiming that such
publication would endanger national security. By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court refused
the injunction. Komesar claims that the nine Justices' radically different opinions all share
Rawls's goal of "the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all." P. 43. They differ, however, in their assumptions about
which institution best achieves this balance of liberties - some preferring an absolutist unregulated marketplace of ideas, others trusting either the courts or the political process to
best determine the balance of liberty and order. Pp. 45-49.
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ner, "where. the market works, the courts allocate the ... balancing
of costs and benefits[ ] to the market; where the market does not
work, the courts make the efficiency determination themselves" (p.
19). To Komesar, such analysis is incomplete:
If the issue involves two institutions - the market and the courts then why does Posner only ask about variations in the ability of the
market? ...
. . . [O]ur question is not whether market performance improves
· or deteriorates with larger numbers of parties, but rather whether the
market works better or worse than the courts.3 1

Komesar observes that the same factors that cause market performance to deteriorate may also impede the functioning of courts, making our choice between the two institutions much more difficult
than Posner recognizes (pp. 21-28).
Komesar criticizes John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust32 as
suffering from a comparable tunnel vision: "Like Posner's analysis
of the common law, Ely's analysis of constitutional law is single institutional, relying largely · on variation in political malfunction"
rather than comparing the varying abilities of the political and judicial processes (p. 199; emphasis added).
Although Komesar's exhaustive critique of such single-institutional and noninstitutional analyses occupies a large part of his
book, he also offers and applies his own affirmative theory of how
to compare institutions. Komesar presents this argument in six
parts. First, he analyzes the three institutions at issue: the political
process, the market, and the courts. He then applies this understanding of institutions to three legal issues: tort reform, constitution making, and constitutional judicial review.
31. Pp. 20-21. Similarly, Posner's analysis of which institution should establish the efficient standard of care in negligence law solely focuses on the varying ability of the market.
Posner argues that the market, which establishes its standard through custom, rather than the
judicial process, should set the standard of care where plaintiffs and defendants can allocate
the costs of accidents between themselves through market interactions. From his vantage
point, Posner finds himself at a loss to explain the holding in a well-known custom case, The
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.1932), in which Judge Learned Hand affirmed a negligence
decision for a plaintiff even though the defendant and plaintiff were in a market relationship
and the defendant's standard of care complied with custom. P. 159. Komesar explains Judge
Hand's holding in T.J. Hooper as not just an evaluation of the market's varying ability to set
the standard of care but also as a comparison with the alternative: judges and juries' varying
competence to set care standards. Pp. 159-60. Unlike medical malpractice cases, which often
present a jury with complex technical questions beyond its competence, T.J. Hooper involved
the relatively simple question of whether a tug-owner was negligent in failing to have a radio
on board to warn against an impending storm. Pp. 160-61. Thus Komesar notes that the
difference between Judges Posner and Hand "may stem from their implicit institutional presumptions or default positions. To Posner, if the market works relatively well, the market
gets the job. To Hand, if the courts work relatively well, the courts get the job (or, more
accurately, retain the job)." P. 161 n.16.
32. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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According to Komesar's theory of comparative institutional
analysis, which he terms the "participation-centered approach," an
institution's competence depends on the participation of the institutional actors within it (p. 7). Komesar claims that "the actions of
the mass of participants ... best accounts for the variation in how
institutions function. In this sense, the adjudicative and political
processes are like the market, with its myriad of buyers and sellers"
(p. 7). Drawing upon his law and economics background,
Komesar's participation-centered theory examines the costs and
benefits to individuals of participating in each institution.
Komesar relies upon the celebrated insights of two scholars,
Mancur Olson and Ronald Coase, to elaborate upon these costs
and benefits.33 Regarding benefits, Komesar takes from Olson's
work on collective action34 the importance of "the distribution of
stakes" - the average per capita benefit derived from institutional
participation and the variance of this benefit across the population
of beneficiaries. Following Coase,35 Komesar portrays the costs of
institutional participation - including transaction costs, litigation
costs, and political participation costs - as the costs of information
and organization. Chapters Three, Four, and Five apply this costbenefit framework to describe the workings of three institutions:
the political process, the market, and the courts.
Komesar's discussion of the political process synthesizes the insights of previous scholars to introduce a new way of thinking about
the functioning of legislatures that he calls the "two-force model"
(p. 53). Komesar begins by introducing the prominent position in
current legal scholarship of the "interest group theory of politics"
(p. 53). Derived from the Nobel-prize-winning work of economists
George Stigler and James Buchanan,36 this theory asserts that
small, concentrated interest groups are often able to exert a disproportionate influence over the political process - obtaining legislation or regulation even though the gains to the interest group are
less than the losses imposed on the dispersed majority. A classic
33. Komesar candidly acknowledges his intellectual debt to Olson and Coase. He writes:
Nothing is new or startling about the participation-centered approach. Ronald Coase's
transaction cost approach ... emphasized the cost of information in understanding institutional activity .... The emphasis on the distribution of stakes can be traced to Mancur
Olson's work on collective action. That this analysis is simple and its components well
known are major advantages •.. for my purposes. An analytical framework meant to
serve so vast a range of possible investigations ••. must be as simple, accessible, and
intuitively sensible as possible.
P. 8; citations omitted.
34. MANcUR OLSON, THE Lome OF CoLI.ECilVE ACilON (1965), cited at p. 8 n.3.
35. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937), cited at p. 8 n.2;
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcqN. 1 (1960), cited at p. 8 n.2.
36. See pp. 53-58 (discussing TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKINO SOCIETY (James
Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
EcoN. & MoMT. Scr. 3 (1971)).
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example is the imposition of a protective tariff that benefits a small
cadre of producers to the detriment of a larger group of consumers.
Komesar refers to this phenomenon, variously known as capture
theory, special interest theory, or interest group theory, as "minoritarian bias" (p. 56).
Komesar argues that current scholars' preoccupation with such
minoritarian bias37 obscures an arguably more severe malfunction
in the political process - majoritarian bias (p. 67). Such "tyranny
of the majority" is the countervailing force whereby a larger group
imposes disproportionately high costs on a smaller group. In addition to the obvious historical examples involving mistreatment of
racial minorities - slavery, Jim Crow laws, and the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II - Komesar cites local
zoning ordinances as frequent examples of majoritarian bias (p. 81).
The existence of both forms of bias makes it very difficult to
predict which type of political malfunction will occur - more so
than the theorists who concentrate solely on one form of bias may
think. Komesar's theory, like most current scholarship, predicts
that minoritarian bias will prove the more frequent problem, because small, concentrated interest groups often can gain great benefits at reduced costs of information-gathering and organization. But
Komesar also enumerates the factors that make majoritarian bias
more probable: increases in "the absolute per capita stakes of the
majority, the non-uniformity of distribution (which affects the possibility of entrepreneurship), [and] the size of the majority[;]" as
well as reductions in "the comple:Xity of the issue, and the cost of
information" (p. 88). Komesar concludes that although it is likely
that minoritarian bias is a more common problem, "the severity of
majoritarian bias - its total impact on society - may rival that of
minoritarian bias" (p. 81).
Komesar's discussion of markets in Chapter Four, although interesting in its own right, adds little to the book. After reciting
Coase's renowned insight into the importance of transaction costs,
Komesar insists on the parallel significance of transaction benefits.
Chapter Four further provides a primer on various forms of market
failure, explains the necessity of a stable political process to support
a well-functioning market, and concludes with a comparison of rent
seeking in the market and the political process. Because his voluminous real-world applications make no arguments for or against
the market choice, Komesar's discussion of markets is probably the
least interesting part of his book.
37. As examples of legal scholars who have applied interest-group theory to issues in
constitutional law and statutory interpretation, Komesar refers to, among others, Erwin
Chemerinsky, Richard Epstein, Cass Sunstein, Frank Easterbrook, and Jonathan Macey. See
p. 216 n.38.
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Chapter Five specifies the unique traits of the judicial process,
and thereby sets the stage for the transition to Komesar's most engaging argument. In this chapter, Komesar contends that courts as compared to the political and market processes - have three
distinct structural attributes. First, formal and costly requirements,
such as justiciability, jurisdiction, pleading, and discovery procedures, govern participation in the courts, limit the information
judges and juries receive, and constrain the judges' ability to initiate
decisionmaking. Second, judges and juries are far more independent than their market or political counterparts: judges generally receive autonomy-enhancing employment benefits such as life tenure,
while juries are one-shot decisionmakers walled off from outside
influence. Finally, compared to markets and political systems,
courts have a very limited reach. Komesar concludes that these
unique features demand that judges carefully husband the limited
resources of adjudication, "by substituting adjudicative decisionmaking for political decision-making or market decision-making
only when the balance of bias, competence, and scale favors that
substitution" (p. 150).
Komesar's most comprehensive and intriguing argument follows
in Chapter Six: He argues that the characteristics of certain private
tort claims do in fact require a substitution of judicial for political
decisionmaking. Applying his participation-centered approach to
the issue of tort reform, Komesar argues that the distribution of
costs and benefits in tort cases involving products and services
strongly favors the institution of judicial decisionmaking. Komesar
analyzes the distribution of stakes among four groups: actual and
potential injurers and actual and potential victims. He argues that
because products and services cases involve a fairly small number of
"high-stakes" potential injurers who will face high-cost lawsuits, as
well as a fairly small number of "high-stakes" actual victims who
will sustain high-cost damages,38 there exists a particularly strong
possibility that adjudication of these tort claims can deter accidents.
The victims have strong incentives to bring tort suits, and the injurers have strong incentives to learn how to decrease accidents.39
38. The potential victims do not have high stakes. Before an accident occurs there exists a
large number of potential victims, the vast majority of whom will not suffer an accident.
Only after the accident does the actual victim sustain the concentrated, high-stakes costs of
damages.
39. Komesar compares two other possible distributions, involving "low-stakes" potential
injurers and "low-stakes" actual victims. The first group appears in cases in which a much
larger number of dispersed potential injurers exists, such as automobile accident cases. The
second group appears in cases in which a much larger number of small dispersed injuries
occurs, such as minor pollution cases. In cases involving these two groups, the possibility of
effective deterrence decreases because the low-stakes potential injurers lack the incentive to
incur the costs of learning how to decrease accidents, and the low-stakes actual victims lack
the incentive to incur the information-gathering and organization costs required to bring suit
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As Komesar points out, this distribution of stakes also makes
such cases particularly poor candidates for effective political control. Although the actual victims have high stakes, the potential victims do not.40 Thus, potential victims have little incentive to
participate in the political process especially relative to the highstakes potential injurers. Komesar writes "[t]his overrepresentation
has all the elements of minoritarian bias" (p. 192). He concludes:
"The tort reform process is biased. Even if some tort reform is necessary, the biased political process ... is likely to go much farther
than it should" (p. 192). These findings lead Komesar to recommend that courts substitute for the political process either by construing reform statutes narrowly or by invalidating them through
constitutional review (p. 193). He notes with satisfaction that a
great number of courts have already done so (p. 193).
Chapters Seven and Eight explore the institutional implications
of constitution making and constitutional judicial review. They criticize, from an institutional perspective, various constitutional law
theories, including interest-group political theory, originalist and
fundamental-rights approaches to judicial review, and the theories
contained in Ely's Democracy and Distrust, 41 and Epstein's
Takings. 42

Komesar concludes his book by summarizing in rule-like form
its three main "Propositions" - that goal or value choice alone is
insufficient; that institutional analysis must be comparative; and
that it also must be participation-centered.
Given the breadth of Komesar's analysis, it is important to recognize certain points and distinctions that he does not make. First,
Komesar largely ignores the institutional choice between the market and the political process. In so doing, he avoids the interesting
debates over the comparative merits of various forms of regulated
and unregulated markets. As Komesar admits, his account concentrates on the question of when courts should substitute their judgments for those of the political process (p. 273).
Secondly, unlike Hart and Sacks for example, Komesar never
explicitly analyzes the administrative process as a distinct institution. Although he does compare administrative agencies to juries
(pp. 138-42), he does not treat such agencies as a separate branch
worthy of its own participation-centered analysis. Rather he lumps
the bureaucracy with the legislature under the rubric of "the political process." This seems unfortunate, given the likelihood that the
against the injurer. Pp. 161-70. Thus, the distribution of stakes discussed in the text compares favorably with these two.
40. See discussion supra note 38.
41. ELY, supra note 32.
42. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
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manner of participation in these two institutions differs. Such an
analysis also ignores the interesting issues surrounding the relationship between courts and agencies that stands at the heart of administrative law.
Thirdly, Komesar essentially ignores the federalist dimension of
institutions. Komesar especially slights the institutional distinctions
of the state courts. More specifically, his discussion of judicial independence rests on an implicit assumption of Article III safeguards.
Also, his discussion of the role of courts focuses on constitutional
review and statutory interpretation and fails to elaborate on the institutional dimensions of common-law policymaking.43
Ultimately, despite the breadth and sweeping goals of
Komesar's project,44 his book provides only a preliminary analysis.
For example, although he presents detailed criticisms of faulty
single-institutional and noninstitutional analyses - namely, Posner's ideas on local pollution and the application of Rawls's theory
to the Pentagon Papers case - Komesar never concludes which institution should be preferred in either case. His general pattern is
to criticize earlier analyses, vehemently advocate for a comparative
institutional approach, and demur on the results of this approach.45
But even this criticism is not fully justified. Komesar does offer
two specific conclusions - he supports the institution of judicial
decision in tort reform and he rejects Richard Epstein's expansive
version of the Takings Clause. Moreover, he presents his book as a
blueprint outlining general principles for future analysts, and he acknowledges that the analysis he describes will prove difficult and
will often produce uncertain answers.46 In the end, his elegant and
accessible book has accomplished a difficult task. It emphasizes the
distinction between public values and the institutions we choose to
43. This may simply be an outgrowth of his Jack of interest in the institutional choice
between markets and regulation, which can be characterized as the choice between commonJaw property and liability rules. Komesar does, however, discuss such issues in his criticism of
Judge Posner's analysis of local pollution problems. Pp. 14-28.
44. He begins the book by stating: "My aim in this book is to recast the analysis of law
and public policy ...." P. ix. He closes it by affirming: "My ultimate goal is to aid the
refonnation of society." P. 274.
45. Moreover, at several points in the book, Komesar explicitly puts off difficult questions
of application, noting, for example: "In these examples and others . • • , there are some
nascent lessons for constitution making in general. The challenge of developing these lessons
will have to await future work." P. 231. "I will leave to another day or, hopefully, another
author, the task of thoroughly developing a comparative institutional analysis of statutory
interpretation." P. 194 n.77. He even equivocates on the issue of judicial review of tort
refonn statutes: "[T]he issue of whether and to what extent tort refonn decisions should be
reviewed by the courts is one I will save for another day. It is too complex and too volatile to
be handled as an aside here." P. 195.
46. Komesar concludes by observing that his "participation-centered approach .•• is [no]
more than a rope bridge across the chasm of institutional choice. Much more must be done
and the work promises to be frustratingly slow and difficult•••• [But i]f I have done my job,
[other] analysts will now carry forward the task." Pp. 275-56.
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achieve them, and it usefully investigates the ways these different
instituitons can fail. As his numerous examples illustrate, the task
of comparing institutions is all too easy to overlook or perform
poorly. This powerful reminder about the importance of comparative institutional competence will only enrich the study of law and
public policy.
-

David A. Luigs

